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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Constitution establishes the executive branch of
the state government,' vesting the supreme executive power in the
governor,2 and declares that he "shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed and the affairs of the state efficiently and eco-
nomically administered. '3 Although the Nebraska Governor has
been termed an official with little power to discharge the responsi-
bility given him by the legislature and the constitution,4 the power
and prestige of the office make him, in fact, responsible for the
operation of the government. His power to appoint major depart-
ment heads,5 his position on the Board of Pardons,6 his constitutional
authorization to send messages to the legislature,7 including the
initial state budget recommendations,, and his role as commander
of the militia,9 as well as his participation in legislative matters'°--
a notable departure from the doctrine of separation of powers-do
* B.S., 1927, Kansas State College; LL.B., 1931, University of Nebraska.
Governor of Nebraska, 1961-.
t Research Assistant, B.A., 1959, University of Nebraska. Presently a junior
in the College of Law, University of Nebraska.
I NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Cahill, The Separation of Powers in Nebraska, 18 NEB. L. BULL. 367, 368(1939): "The problem might rather be stated somewhat as follows: Given
a certain number of responsibilities, either by the legislature or by the
constitution, what may the governor, by virtue of his executive office, do
to discharge them? In a word, the answer seems to be, 'Very little.'"
5 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
6 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
7NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
s NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
9 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
10 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 15. The veto power of the governor, practically
speaking, gives him four votes in the Unicameral. In order for the Legis-
lature to pass bills over the governor's veto, a three-fifths vote of the
elected members is required.
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place the machinery of the state within the control of the chief
executive. The constitution places the responsibility for efficient
government on the shoulders of the governor. Thus, it is his re-
sponsibility to weed out inefficiency in government and, when nec-
essary, to take steps to urge the legislature and the people of the
state to amend the constitution when it may be a deterrent to eco-
nomical or practical government.
This article will deal with recommended changes for stream-
lining the executive branch of Nebraska government through
amendments to the constitution. The major areas in need of change
are the boards and commissions created in the executive section of
the Constitution; i.e., the Railway Commission, Board of Control,
Board of Pardons and other areas of executive responsibility, such
as the Highway Commission and executive officers. The Unicameral
has made significant strides in the area of streamlining state gov-
ernment. The changes recommended here deal with areas in which
the present administration believes progress can and should be
made.
Whenever Nebraskans contemplate amending their constitu-
tion they should keep in mind the fundamental principle of separa-
tion of powers inherent in almost all state governmental structures."
Nebraska's Constitution places governmental responsibility in three
separate and distinct bodies-the Legislature, the Executive, and
the Judiciary. The constitution allows little overstepping of the
11 NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1: "The powers of the government of this state
are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and
judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these de-
partments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the
others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." BEARD,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 535 (9th ed. 1944):
"Among the other principles common to state constitutions . . . is the his-
toric doctrine that the powers of government should be divided into
legislative, executive, and judicial. This concept was not universal at the
beginning of state constitutional development, however. In several
states, the legislatures were almost supreme; in some they elected the
governor, created courts at will, and controlled the entire process of
government."
Compare the division of authority provision of the Nebraska Con-
stitution with Massachusett's Constitution, first adopted at a constitutional
convention begun September, 1779, MASS. CONST. art. XXX: "In the
government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the execu-
tive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws
and not of men."
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three. Much litigation has arisen because of laws which attempted
to delegate to one of the three divisions of government the consti-
tutional powers of either of the other areas. 12 If the people are to
have confidence in the representative system of government, they
12 See State v. Hall, 125 Neb. 236, 249 N.W. 756 (1933); State ex rel.
Howard v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 750, 21 N.W.2d 503 (1946); The Crete Mills
v. Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Neb. 244, 271 N.W. 684
(1937); and Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227
(1960), which is the latest case on the subject holding that the legislature
may not delegate legislative power to an administrative or executive au-
thority. At least part of the policy for strict separation of powers stemmed
from colonial dissatisfaction with appointed governors. From this sub-
ordinated and restricted position in the beginning, the office of the gov-
ernor has risen to a place of high importance in American public life.
HOLLOWAY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 167 (1951). It is interesting that this doctrine of separation of
powers is not explicitly written into the federal constitution. This short-
coming has resulted in an overwhelming growth of the executive branch
of the federal government which Chief Justice Vanderbilt of New Jersey
has termed "the outstanding political phenomenon of the twentieth cen-
tury." VANDERBILT, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its
Present-Day Significance, II ROSCOE POUND LECTURESHIP SERIES
53 (1953). He concludes, "In an age of personal government we need not
despair of a rule of law-and so of liberty-if our legislators will but
respect the essential wisdom of the doctrine of the separation of powers."
Id. at 95. GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERN-
MENT (1916), suggests that the division of powers is a distinct depar-
ture from the English form of "constitutional" government, noting that
the whole American constitutional theory was influenced by the theo-
retical political scientists of the revolutionary era, chief of whom was
Montesquieu, who was an early advocate of distinct separation of powers.
"His theory of the separation of three powers of government was, in the
opinion of the thinking public of that time, the basis of all free govern-
ment. It was therefore incorporated into practically all the early state
constitutions." Id. at 87. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1930), points out that whereas every state constitution is
different in many respects, "all states have the same general scheme of
government-based upon the principle of division of powers." Id. at 455.
Professor Munro points out, additionally, that this separation of powers
provision common to all constitutions of American states is only one of
four outstanding points of uniformity (the other three being republican
form of government, division into local areas of government, and uni-
formity of party system).
It is interesting, too, that one of the defects of the Nebraska Con-
stitution of 1875 was the limitation upon the expansion of the executive
department, indicating that the drafters of that instrument distrusted
executive expansion. I SHELDON, NEBRASKA, THE LAND AND THE
PEOPLE 961 (1930).
Specific exceptions are made, and one of these is that the governor
take an active part in helping mold a system of government which is
modern and efficient. NEB. CONST. art. IV, §§ 7, 8, 15.
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must select their chief executive officer on the basis of his program
for improving the state at the least possible cost to the taxpayer.
It is only through the governor's influence in legislative matters
that he can carry out the programs which he outlines prior to his
election.
Recent sessions of the legislature have dealt extensively with
amendments to the state constitution. 13 Alterations in the Executive
clause have been included in these proposed amendments; 14 for
example, there have been bills to submit constitutional amendments
to the voters to change the tenure of the governor from two to four
years, and to elect the governor and the lieutenant governor on the
same political ticket, rather than separately. 15
II. THE RAILWAY COMMISSION
A bill has been introduced which proposes a constitutional
change in the method of selecting the members of the State Railway
Commission at large, but the legislature has passed over an im-
portant and perplexing problem." At the present time, the consti-
tution provides for the terms of the railway commissioners and
13 For example, the 1957 session of the Legislature authorized submission
to the voters of amendments to NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2; art. V, § 27,
and art. VIII, § 4.
14 A bill to transfer the general management, control and government of
all state charitable, mental, reformatory and penal institutions from the
Board of Control to the Legislature was passed by the Unicameral in
1957, and when approved by the electorate in the 1958 general election,
amended NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 19, thus removing the Board from the
list of constitutionally established agencies.
15 In the 1961 session of the Legislature, L.B. 101 and L.B. 105 were intro-
duced, providing for an increase in the term of office of the governor
from two to four years and the same increase in the lieutenant governor's
term. The bills also provided that these two officers be of the same
political party and elected on the same ticket. L.B. 101 was passed by
the Legislature 39-1, and the proposed amendment will be submitted
to the voters at the general election in 1962. The new terms will, if
authorized, begin with the 1966 general election.
16 L.B. 299, introduced on Jan. 24, 1961, was submitted to the Public Health
and Miscellaneous Subjects Committee for hearing. The bill provided for
an amendment to NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20, to authorize the election of
railway commissioners from districts as the Legislature might provide,
but made no provision for establishing qualifications for members of
the commission. State v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N.W.2d 892 (1942) held
that the Legislature may make reasonable restrictions upon eligibility
to hold the office of member of the Railway Commission, even though the
constitution makes no such provision expressly.
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their method of selection by popular election. 1 7 The 1961 bill would
revise the method of electing the commissioners by having indi-
vidual elections on a district basis, rather than at large, as at pres-
ent.18 However, the real problem with the Commission is whether
the members should be elected at all. It would be better for the
state if the governor were to appoint the commissioners on the basis
of pre-determined qualifications. The Commission regulates highly
technical fields of business within the state, and unfortunately, in
the past some members of the Commission have been elected by
the voters without a careful examination of the candidates' qualifi-
cations for office. It is doubtful whether the average voter could
intelligently select a candidate on the basis of his knowledge of the
regulated fields. 19 This is not an indictment of the Nebraska voter,
but rather an admission that the complex problems of public utility
regulation are outside of the everyday experience of voters.20
The kinds of businesses brought under state regulation as public
utilities include petroleum pipelines, railroads, water companies,
telegraph and telephone services, bus and truck lines, taxicab com-
panies, and air transport companies. In addition to these extensive
duties, the Commission licenses public storage warehouses and pub-
lic grain warehouses as well as purchasers of grain for resale. In
17 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20.
18 Compare L.B. 299 (1961) with Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 100. The Rail-
way Commission 18 (1960), in which recommendations for legislative
action are made.
19 It should be kept in mind that the voter generally looks upon the Rail-
way Commission race as a minor part of the election. BABCOCK, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 382 (1957), has recom-
mended that the best prescription for good government is the short
ballot: "[I]t reduces the number of candidates to proportions the
voter can handle. Instituting the short ballot would mean doing away
with numerous offices that ought not to be elective anyway, but should
be made appointive or abolished altogether. This would strengthen the
principle of placing legal responsibility on those who are compelled
anyway to accept it politically. Moreover, the short ballot would force
the obliteration or consolidation of many outmoded governmental units."
20 No qualifications are laid down either by law or custom. The best quali-
fication seems to be regarded as past experience on the Commission.
The fact of the matter is that the Commission not only regulates difficult
technical matters but, as a matter of course, holds quasi-judicial hearings
with an internally created set of procedural rules. See comment, New
Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Nebraska Railway Com-
mission, 40 NEB. L. REV. 129 (1960). One of the least qualifications
should be that a member of the Commission be a member of the bar.
State v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941), held that one not
admitted to the bar is not authorized to practice before the Nebraska
State Railway Commission.
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thirty-six of the fifty states members of public utility regulatory
agencies are appointed, usually by the chief executive, rather than
popularly elected. 21 In Nebraska, the present commission was cre-
ated by a constitutional amendment passed in 1906.22 The three
members are elected for staggered six-year terms.2 3 The constitu-
tion provides that the powers and duties of "such commission shall
include the regulation of rates, services and general control of com-
mon carriers as the Legislature may provide by law.' 24 While it is
true that the legislature may provide for qualifications of the mem-
bers of the Commission, it has never done so. 25
A Legislative Council study committee has recommended that
the Commission be removed from the list of constitutional agencies
and made a statutory agency.26
The 1957 Nebraska Legislature, upon the recommendation of an-
other study committee of the Legislative Council, proposed a con-
stitutional amendment to make the Board of Control a statutory
rather than a constitutional agency. This amendment was subse-
quently approved by the people of the state. The reasoning there
was that the Legislature should be allowed to make needed changes
in the makeup or operation of state agencies which had the respon-
sibility of major governmental programs or which had a great im-
pact on the people of the state.
The committee report pointed out that no improvements could be
made in such agencies which were established when conditions were
different in Nebraska, as long as they are based on constitutional
provisions and operated by constitutional authority. For example,
the agency, under its constitutional authority, has inherent power to
21 Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 100, supra note 18.
22 The regulation of public utilities goes back to the Constitution of 1875
and the first governmental agency created to regulate utilities was es-
tablished in 1885. The 1887 Legislature enacted a more comprehensive
regulatory statute but the act creating it was declared unconstitutional in
1900. For a cross section of the history of the Commission before the
courts, see In re Railroad Commissioners, 15 Neb. 679 (1883); State v.
Burlington & M.R.R. CO., 60 Neb. 741 (1901); State ex rel. Johnson v.
Chase, 147 Neb. 758, 25 N.W.2d 1 (1947), which broadly deals with
eligibility for the Liquor Control Commission, but includes historical
references to utility regulatory agencies in Nebraska.
23 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 20.
24 Ibid.
25 State v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N.W.2d 892 (1942).
26 Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 100, supra note 18, Recommendation 3, p. 18.
The Committee pointed out that the matter of attaching qualifications to
the post of Railway Commissioner could be worked out if the com-
mission were a statutory agency.
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establish its own rules of procedure. 27 The committee found in-
stances where the Commission's procedure was contrary to the usual
procedure established by law.28 If the agency were statutory in na-
ture, the legislature could provide the appropriate rules of proce-
dure to be allowed and make other necessary changes in accordance
with agency needs.
III. THE BOARD OF CONTROL
Some objectors to the appointment of Railway Commission
members have stated that if the commission could be improved by
making it a statutory rather than a constitutional body, why has
so much trouble been evident in the Board of Control, which is not
only an appointive body but has also been removed by a 1958 con-
stitutional amendment from the list of constitutional agencies?30
These objectors fail to realize that that amendment merely took
the Board of Control out of the constitution and gave the legislature
authority to determine how the state institutions should be man-
aged. It did not, in fact, change the government of the institutions.
Moreover, the legislature has never established any qualifications
for members of the Board of Control. 31 Since there are no qualifica-
tions of a professional nature for members of the Board, they have
often been appointed because of political factors. No governor has
27 Id. at 18-19.
28 A statutory agency could be forced by law to comply with a code of
civil procedure allowing, among other things, for appeals. This is not
necessarily true when the separation of powers clause is construed to
protect the agency from internal disruption by the legislative branch
of government. There is a question of the applicability of the Nebraska
Administrative Procedure Act as passed by the 1959 session of the Leg-
islature. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901, -908 (Supp. 1959). The new rules
of Commission procedure are set out in Comment, supra note, 20, 40 NEB.
L. REV. 129 (1960), and certainly provide some safeguards, procedurally.
Note, however, that the rules are written by the Commission itself, and
may be likewise altered.
29 Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 100, supra note 18, at 20.
30 That is by the 1958 amendment to NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 19, which
gave the legislature power to provide for management of the agencies
now under the Board of Control.
31 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 19, provided for selection of the members of the
Board of Control, but failed to establish any professional qualifications.
The political qualifications were that the members were required to
"... give such bonds . . . as may be provided by law." See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-101 (Reissue 1958), which provides that no more than
two board members shall be of the same political party and that no two
of them shall reside, when appointed, in the same congressional district.
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been under any obligation other than an undefined moral obliga-
tion to appoint qualified persons. The salary limitation 32 makes it
difficult to obtain Board members qualified as penologists, psychi-
atrists, administrators or attorneys. Thus laymen, often with no
institutional experience, are named to the Board. Notwithstanding
these remaining problems, the 1959 Legislature was not idle with
the power granted it by the 1958 amendment to Article IV.33 The
transfer of the School for the Deaf and the School for the Blind
to the State Department of Education was completed on July 1,
1960. In 1961, a bill to establish state direction of penal and correc-
tional institutions was introduced, which would remove from the
Board of Control authority to manage the five penal institutions.34
In addition, the legislature passed a resolution in 195935 which
directed that a study of the Board of Control system be made. The
study was completed and the committee recommended that the Di-
vision of Public Welfare be divorced from the Board of Control
and established as a separate Department of Public Welfare to be
headed by a director to be appointed by the governor, and that the
director of the new department should have a minimum of seven
years of experience in public welfare work.36 The committee also
recommended the Control Board be expanded to a seven-member,
policy-making-only body, composed of a psychiatrist, an attorney,
a doctor of medicine, one person with at least five years of public
welfare work and three lay members, one of whom should be a
woman to be appointed by the governor for staggered terms of six
32 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-104 (Reissue 1958): "Each member . . . shall
receive a salary of five thousand five hundred dollars a year, payable
monthly. In addition to his salary, each member of the board shall be
entitled to necessary expenses incurred while travelling on official
business ...... In addition to the above sum, twenty-five hundred dollars
per year is paid to each member of the Board by the State Assistance
Fund, in accordance with NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-310 (Reissue 1958),
making a total of $8,000.00 per year.
33 The swift action was due, in part, to strong popular support for a change
in the Board of Control system. NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
NEBRASKA BLUE BOOK 588 (1958) (218,062 for the amendment; 98,109
against).
34 L.B. 375, introduced Jan. 26, 1961, read, in part: "to establish the position
of Director of Penal and Correctional Institutions and to provide for his
qualifications . . . to transfer control of all penal and correctional institu-
tions from the Board of Control to the Director of Penal and Correctional
Institutions .... .
35 Leg. Res. No. 9, adopted June 26, 1959.36 Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 101, The Board of Control 22 (Nov. 1960).
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years.8 7 This board would be called the Board of Public Institutions
and would appoint a director with administrative experience in
state institutional management. These recommendations are def-
initely the first and proper step toward eliminating the poor Board
of Control system now existing in Nebraska. The bill incorporating
these ideas was introduced in the 1961 session.38 But these bills
should not be the end of Nebraska's efforts to improve state insti-
tutional management. Thought should be given to legislation to
establish a state director of mental health, apart from the Board
of Health,3 9 to supervise the state mental health institutions, and
to a state director of rehabilitations, either within or separate from
the Department of Education, to direct the state rehabilitation
institutions.40 The problem of consolidating the bills and eliminating
overlapping provisions should, of course, be left to the legislature.
The rationale behind such changes in institutional administration is
the same sound rationale as that behind altering the Railway Com-
mission: To provide the best possible management and administra-
tion of our government. By such changes the management would
be independent from political pressures hampering fair and impar-
tial government. The retention of the Board of Control as merely
a policy-making board would be useful for formulating institutional
policy and maintaining general oversight over the application of
that policy.41 The complexities of modern institutional manage-
ment, penology, and the regulation of complex public utilities are
better left to experts in those fields.
While Nebraska may be behind some states in improving the
system of "government by board and commission," we can benefit
37 Id. at 23.
38 L.B. 279, introduced Jan. 23, 1961, read, in part, ... to replace the Board
of Control by a Department of Public Institutions . . . to provide the
qualifications ... of such board... "
39 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2612 (Reissue 1958), provides that the Director
of Health shall be the executive officer of the State Board of Health
and that he shall administer ". . . all laws relating to public health . . ."
which, in the absence of a provision in the laws creating a Department
of Mental Health, seems to make the Director of Health the ex officio
director of Mental Health.
40 The placing of the Director of Mental Health within the Department of
Education is consistent with the concept of rehabilitation of the mentally
ill. In the alternative, it is noted, that the director could be placed directly
under the State Department of Public Institutions.
41 The Board of Control, if continued, would be a part-time organ only. It
would be non-salaried. Under this arrangement, the responsibility for
the policy would lie with the board, leaving no question of where the
blame should be put for bad decisions. Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 101,
supra note 36, at 23.
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from the experiences of the other states and avoid their shortcom-
ings in the area of welfare and correctional work. Many states
place all institutions of one type under a separate agency.42 Illinois43
and Massachusetts44 are significant examples of this form of admin-
istration. The legislative council study committee on the Board of
Control noted that the national trend does not favor committing the
control of state institutions to a full-time board with executive and
administrative powers.
45
As indicated, the present state administration looks with some
reserve upon government by board and committee. However, the
problems of such a system cannot be solved overnight. In addition,
each branch of the government has individual problems which tend
to perpetuate government by committee. Therefore, a slow retreat
from the system is recommended. First-glance inconsistencies in
the policy of avoiding government by board and the recommenda-
tion of continuing the Railway Commission with qualified personnel
are reconciled because of the nature of the Commission. The Rail-
42Id. at 13. See also BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLI-
TICS, 628 (9th ed. 1944): "In a number of states constitutional amend-
ments or statutes or both have consolidated, more or less, the offices
and boards of state administration . . . placed them immediately
under the governor's supervision, enlarged his appointing, removing, and
directing powers, made him responsible for the preparation of the budget,
and given him, in some respects, a position akin to that of the President
of the United States." Beard emphasizes that Nebraska has made strides
in this matter of reorganization and consolidation in the so-called code
departments. HOLLOWAY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (1951), adds that the trend in reorganization is
toward integration of the once independent executive agencies.
43 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 127, §§ 55, -55.30 (1959), creates a Department
of Public Health, "[T]o have general supervision of the interests of the
health and lives of the people of the State." ILL. REV. STAT. c. 127, §
55 (a) (1959), creates a Department of Public Safety, with control of penal
administration. A Department of Public Welfare is established by ILL.
REV. STAT. c. 127, § 53 (1959). In addition to the separate departments
Illinois utilizes advisory boards for separate divisions of departments. For
example, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 127, § 6.04 (1959), sets up a Board of Welfare
Commissioners composed of five persons, an advisory board for the
hospital-school and facilities and services, an advisory board to the
Division of Alcoholism, etc. This broadened government by board is
necessary because of unusual technical problems in, for example, the
area of alcoholism.
44 MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 121 (1932), establishes a Department of Public
Welfare, subdividing into authorities the specific welfare duties, such as
housing and redevelopment authorities, MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 123 (1932),
establishes a Department of Mental Health. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 125
(1932), establishes the Office of Commissioner of Correction.
45 Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 101, supra note 36, at 16.
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way Commission must operate as a regulatory agency in adjudicat-
ing individual rights of companies or citizens. The commission
system provides for a meeting of three qualified members' minds for
the fairest regulation of utilities. A distinction can also be seen
between the nature of the duties of a Board of Control and that of
the Railway Commission. The latter is not in business, so to speak;
it regulates, primarily, as directed by law. The Board of Control,
on the other hand, is in business-managing institutions, purchasing
supplies, hiring physicians, nurses, penologists, administrators and
educators, and hunting for ways in which to operate a function of
state government on an efficient and economical basis.
IV. THE HIGHWAY COMMISSION
In light of the above distinction, the present administration
recommends a change in the State Highway Advisory Commission.
The administration had supported a bill which would make the
Commission an executive body, but as a part-time, policy-making
organ. 46 The Commission is analogous to the Board of Control in that
its primary concern is doing business for the state, i.e., building
roads. It does not regulate or adjudicate rights of private parties
as its major job. There does not seem to be justification for a full-
time Highway Commission. It should, however, have executive
authority. The proposed legislation would make the commission
an executive body and authorize it to hire and fire the state engi-
neer. At the present time, the commission only advises the gov-
ernor, who has executive power over the state engineer.47 The
governor thus has the last word over construction of highways,
though he is constantly subjected to political pressures and may
know absolutely nothing of technical highway problems. It can be
seen that by placing policy-making decisions in the hands of an
expert commission and removing highway building from political
crossfire, the Department of Roads can get to the job of improving
Nebraska's highways.
46 L.B. 470, introduced Jan. 31, 1961.
47 The governor, as chief executive officer of the state, has direct control
of departments under him. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-701.05 (Reissue 1958),
transferred all the powers of the Department of Roads and Irrigation to
the Department of Roads. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-701.01 (Reissue 1958),
provides that the state engineer shall have full control, management,
supervision, administration and direction of the Department of Roads.
The State engineer is appointed directly by the governor, who can,
therefore, control all policy and decisions of the department.
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V. THE BOARD OF PARDONS
The administration has also supported a measure which would
drastically revise the Board of Pardons.48 All three members of
the present board have supported L.B. 37749 which contemplates
establishment of a full-time Board of Pardons composed of profes-
sional men appointed by the governor.5 0 The three members of the
board, the Governor, the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State, appearing before the Government and Military Affairs Com-
mittee of the Nebraska Legislature, admitted they had neither the
time nor the qualifications to do the best job possible. The tendency
toward political overtones in the decisions of the Board of Pardons
cannot be disputed. The Attorney General contended that it is
unfair to the prisoners to have him sit on the Board because of his
role as chief prosecutor for Nebraska. The Secretary of State
pointed out that criminology is a highly specialized field and the
Board must have people trained in the area to function at its best.
The Legislative Council Study Committee on Penal Systems has rec-
ommended an amendment to the constitution abolishing the present
ex-officio Board of Pardons.51 The legislature now has the support
and the opportunity to create a permanent three-member Board of
Pardons, appointed by the governor.
VI. LONGER EXECUTIVE TERMS
A proposed constitutional amendment,52 which would lengthen
the term of office of both the governor and lieutenant governor from
two to four years, and require them to be elected jointly, as mem-
bers of the same political party, is recommended. There is little
question that the system of four-year executive terms5 3 has worked
favorably in the federal government. State government would be
48 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13, provides for the Board of Pardons, naming
the Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State to such Board,
reserving in the Governor the power to "grant respites or reprieves in
all cases of conviction for offenses against the laws of the state, except
treason and cases of impeachment, but such respites shall not extend
beyond the next meeting of the Board of Pardons .... .
49 Public hearing on L.B. 377 by the Committee of Government and Military
Affairs of the Legislature, March 24, 1961.
50 L.B. 377, introduced Jan. 26, 1961.
51 Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 105, Penal Systems, 5 (Nov. 1960).
52 L.B. 101 and L.B. 105, introduced Jan. 6, 1961. See note 14, supra.
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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wise to adopt such a system since it would give the governor an
opportunity to propose and carry out a program for Nebraska
without the necessity of beginning a campaign for re-election almost
immediately after taking the oath of office.
Moreover, the illnesses and death of Governor Brooks illus-
trated vividly to Nebraskans the breakdown in state governmental
continuity when governor and lieutenant governor are elected
from different political parties. Serious questions of disability of
the executive are left unresolved at this date because of the gaps
in our law. Moreover, continuity in government is essential in this
day of complexity in government. There is no denying that the
operation of government would be improved if the lieutenant gov-
ernor could step into the governor's shoes and carry out the gov-
ernor's program when the latter was incapacitated.
VII. APPOINTED OFFICERS
Finally, if and when sweeping changes in the executive clause
of the constitution are made, it is recommended that the governor
be empowered to appoint all officers of the executive department.
Although in most states the governor has no part at present in the
selection of these officers,5 4 the policy behind their selection by ap-
pointment is sound.55 The governor is elected by the people to man-
age the state government, in which the other executive officers play
significant roles. However, at times stalemates have existed be-
tween the governor and one of the four executive officers, which
disrupted the establishment of a uniform state policy. No coordina-
tion between executive agencies is guaranteed. The appointment
of executive officers would centralize responsibility and remove any
possible excuse the governor might have for failure to fulfill the
responsibility clearly his by virtue of the constitution. The days of
popular suspicion of governors have passed. The system of checks
and balances in state government protects the people from abuse
54 The governor has no part in the selection of the secretary of state in
41 states; of the auditor in 36 states; of the treasurer in 47 states; and
of the attorney general in 43 states. GRAVES, AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT 317 (1936).
55NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1875), read, "The supreme executive power
shall be vested in the Governor, who shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." The insertion of the words "efficiently and
economically" into NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1920), at least in theory
alter the old state of affairs and suggest that the governor now has some
control over the operation of all branches of the executive division of
government.
STREAMLINING THE EXECUTIVE
by the governor's office and a change is needed to insure efficient
and economical government on the executive level.5 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is the policy of this administration to encourage streamlining
of state government and to discourage government by boards and
commissions which result in loss of efficiency and failure of the
people to be able to pinpoint responsibility for actions adverse to
their interests.
The purpose of the division of powers clause in the Nebraska
Constitution is to insure that the people of the state can spot re-
sponsibility for governmental action and approve or disapprove at
the polls. It is imperative, then, that the governor have power over
state agencies for which he is, in fact, held accountable on election
day.
56 Indeed, an argument for this efficiency through appointment of execu-
tive officers was advanced shortly after the 1919-1920 Constitutional
Convention by GETTYS, THE REORGANIZATION OF STATE GOV-
ERNMENT IN NEBRASKA 42 (1922) along the lines proposed in this
paper, i.e., shortening of the ballot: "If the ballot were shortened the
attention of the people could be concentrated on the election of a few
candidates with greater possibility of choosing much more highly qualified
officials for the most important public offices."
